Deconstruction by its very nature defies institutionalization in an authoritative definition. The concept was
first outlined by Derrida in Of Grammatology where he explored the interplay between language and the
construction of meaning. From this early work, and later works in which he has attempted to explain
deconstruction to others, most notably the Letter to a Japanese Friend, it is possible to provide a basic
explanation of what deconstruction is commonly understood to mean. Three key features emerge from
Derrida‘s work as making deconstruction possible. These are, first, the inherent desire to have a centre, or
focal point, to structure understanding (logocentricism); second, the reduction of meaning to set definitions
that are committed to writing (nothing beyond the text); and, finally, how the reduction of meaning to
writing captures opposition within that concept itself (différance). These three features found the possibility
of deconstruction as an on-going process of questioning the accepted basis of meaning. While the concept
initially arose in the context of language, it is equally applicable to the study of law. Derrida considered
deconstruction to be a ‗problematisation of the foundation of law, morality and politics.‘ For him it was both
‗foreseeable and desirable that studies of deconstructive style should culminate in the problematic of law
and justice.‘ Deconstruction is therefore a means of interrogating the relationship between the two
Derrida takes as his starting point the assertion that modern Western philosophy is characterized by and
constructed around an inherent desire to place meaning at the centre of presence. Put simply, what this
means is that philosophy is driven by a desire for the certainty associated with the existence of an absolute
truth, or an objective meaning that makes sense of our place in the world. Derrida terms this desire
‗logocentrism‘. Its effect is the placing of one particular term or concept, such as justice, at the centre of all
efforts at theorizing or interrogating meaning. The term becomes the core around which meaning is
For Derrida, it is this logocentrism, and the idea of the exteriority of meaning, that opens up the possibility
of deconstruction. He examines how the natural ‗origin‘ of meaning and its ‗institution‘ in writing cannot be
so easily separated. Rather than nature (justice) and institution (law) existing independently of each other,
Derrida suggests that nature itself is constructed only with reference to the institution. So rather than law
being a direct embodiment of justice, how we understand both justice and law is determined by the interplay
between the two. This is a rejection of the rigid separation that makes the quest for certainty possible — of
the very idea that justice exists as a prior objective standard to be discovered. By reading law as reflecting or
embodying the natural origin of justice, what is ignored or concealed are all the other possible
interpretations of justice that are not embodied or encapsulated in the law. In this way writing defines nature,
as well as reflecting it.
Finally, deconstruction is not an act or an operation. Rather, it is something that happens, something that
takes place. It takes place everywhere. It does not require deliberation or consciousness, but rather its
potential exists within our structures of meaning. It is interested in exploring and revealing the internal logic
of ideas and meaning. It is concerned with opening up these structures and revealing the way in which our
understanding of foundational concepts is constructed. This is internal to meaning itself and not dependent
on external factors. What this suggests is that the possibility of deconstruction exists within the structure of
meaning itself, within the structure of difference, and is not something to be found and applied from the
outside. It is primarily concerned with understanding ideas, not with their application.